This excellent post from Don Boudreaux, reminded me of my less worthy attempt at this in 2012.
This is the dynamic in a nutshell:
1. In a freer health care market, the costs of being unhealthy or uninsured is borne by individuals. This provides strong incentives to stay healthy and insured.
2. In #1, some people will still fall through the cracks. Some because of bad choices they made, but others because of unfortunate circumstances.
3. Attempts to solve #2 that involve anything other than encouraging people to make better choices creates moral hazards* that cause even more people to take less responsibility for their health and not buy insurance. This increases costs for those who pay.
4. The same compassionate people who wanted to solve #2 try — with no apparent awareness of this — reproducing the natural incentives in #1 to stay healthy and insured by dictating both. This appears in mandates that sound like, If we’re paying for you health care, then we have the right to tell you how to live your life.
We already see evidence of this in New York City with bans on salt, trans fats and large, sugary drinks. New York was already well down the Obamacare path, which is why New York City was one of the first areas in the U.S. to show signs of #4.
Here’s an example from Japan. I see evidence of this starting here. My employer, for example, is now collecting my BMI and waist size and will soon want to start tracking my exercise activity.
Of course, the First Lady’s efforts to reduce childhood obesity are also initial steps in the direction of #4.
*Moral hazard – A moral hazard is created when some measure taken to reduce risks, increases the risks people are willing to take.
One example of this can be seen in football. Wearing helmets sounds like a logical safety measure, but has resulted in players hitting each other harder and even taking measures (like doping on steroids to build muscle mass) to hit ever harder.
The link to the post about the BMI penalties in Japan provides an example of moral hazard in medicine.